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RECENT CASE NOTES
been repudiated by the American view of a prima facie hiring at will, said,
"There can be no flexible rule in this respect. . . . It is an open question
to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case, or as one
which is dependent upon the understanding and intent of the parties to be
ascertained by influence from their negotiations, usages of business, nature of
the employment, and all of the surrounding circumstances'1 3 In the case
before us, the Indiana Appellate Court in adopting this third doctrine has
altered the view that it set forth in 1897.14
Since our law is a scheme of social control for the betterment of social
interests,1 5 we must look for a rule which will be most beneficial to society
and also give the best results. The third doctrine which is set out by the
Indiana Appellate Court appears to fall into this category in that by using
this rule the objective understanding of the parties to the contract will be
enforced. 16
I. K.
CONTRAcTs-I MPLIED ASSuMPTION OF CONTINUED EXIsTENCE OF BUILDING-
RECOVERY FOR PART PERFORMANCE.-Action to recover the balance of contract
price under a contract to "furnish, fabricate, and erect" two large steel storage
tanks in defendant's building, and to make certain alterations in the building
necessary for the installation of the tanks. Payment was to be made after
each tank was completed, tested, and accepted. After the tanks were partially
erected, an explosion and fire destroyed the building, making further per-
formance impossible; thus, without fault of either party, the uncompleted
tanks and other materials brought onto the premises but not yet incorporated
into the tanks were destroyed. Plaintiff relies especially on a provision of
the contract that "it is further agreed that no . . . injury to or loss or
destruction of said property shall release the buyer from his obligation here-
under." Held, destruction of the building released both parties from their
obligations under the contract and each party was left to bear its own loss.1
A contract to erect an entire building is not discharged by destruction
after part performance; the risk is on the contractor and he has the duty to
rebuild.2 On the other hand, where a contract provides for work to be done
on an existing building, as by repairs or installation of fixtures, the contract
is made on a mutual assumption that the building will continue in existence;
13Putman v. Producers Live Stock Marketing Assoc. (1934), 256 Ky. 196,
75 S. W. (2d) 1075. Third doctrine also upheld in Jones v. Manhattan Horse
Manure Co. (1919), 91 N. J. L. 406, 103 A. 984; Cudney v. R. B. Phillips
Mfg. Co. (1917), 181 App. Div. 257, 168 N. Y. S. 268; Willis v. Wyllys Corp.
(1922), 98 N. J. L. 180, 119 A. 24; Southwell v. Parker Plow Co. (1926), 234
Mich. 292, 207 N. W. 872; Davis v. Englestein (1932), 263 11. App. 57.
14 Supra, note 7. Speeder Cycle Co. v. Teeter.
15 Willis, Introduction to Anglo-American Law, p. 13.
16Problem discussed in this note also discussed by Hardman, Contracts of
Agency Without Stipulations as to Duration, 35 West Virginia L. Q. 116.
1 Rossville Alcohol and Chemical Corporation v. Steel Const. Co. (Ind. App.
1937), 8 N. E. (2d) 1016.
2 School District v. Dauchy (1856), 25 Conn. 530; Prather v. Latshaw
(1919), 188 Ind. 204, 122 N. E. 721.
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its accidental destruction operates as an implied casual condition subsequent
to release both parties from further obligations under the contract.3 As to
these two propositions, the authorities are in accord. A clear break in
authorities is found on the question of the right of the contractor, thus dis-
charged from the duty of further performance on a contract to work on an
existing building, to recover for part performance prior to the destruction.
It is held in England and in several American states that all rights and
liabilities are discharged and that the law will aid neither party, leaving
each to bear its loss as it fell. 4 The majority of the states, however, permit
recovery in one form or another: recovery pro tanto by treating the contract
as divisible upon destruction;5 recovery in quasi-contract for benefits con-
ferred;6 recovery quantum meruit presumptively at the contract rate;7 re-
covery allowed, but decision ambiguous as to the standard employed. 8
The problem involved is an apportionment of loss between two innocent
parties, and it is not surprising that the various courts have taken different
views as to what is a fair and reasonable solution. The contractor has
expended time and money upon the owner's property and presents a strong
argument for compensation; on the other hand, it seems a considerable burden
to force the owner to pay for work which never reached a stage where he
could make use of it. The cases which deny any recovery purport to appor-
3 See cases cited below, notes 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
4 Krause v. Board of Trustees of Crothersville (1904), 162 Ind. 278, 70
N. E. 264, 65 L. R. A. 111, 102 Am. St. Rep. 203, 1 Ann. Cas. 460; Appleby
v. Myers (1867), L. R., 2 C. P. 650; Anglo-Egyptian Nay Co. v. Rennie
(1875), L. R., 10 C. P. 271; Charrette-Kirk Co. v. McKittrick (1912), 3
W. W. R. 448, 22 W. L. R. 711, 22 Man. R. 724, 8 D. L. R. 365; Clark v.
Collier (1893), 100 Cal. 256, 34 P. 677; Taulbee v. McCarty (1911), 144 Ky.
199, 137 S. W. 1045; Louisville Foundry etc. Co. v. Patterson (1906), 29
Ky. Law. Rep. 349, 93 S. W. -22; Brumby v. Smith (1841), 3 Ala. 123;
Siegel, Cooper, & Co. v. Eaton and Prince Co. (1895), 165 I1. 550, 46
N. E. 449; Huyett Mfg. Co. v. Chicago Edison Co. (1897), 167 III. 233, 47
N. E. 384.
5 Hollis v. Chapman (1871), 36 Tex. 1; Weis v. Devlin (1887), 67 Tex. 507,
3 S. W. 726, 60 Am. Rep. 765; Schwartz v. Saunders (1867), 46 Ill. 18;
Dolan v. Rogers (1896), 149 N. Y. 489, 44 N. E. 167; Hysell v. Sterling
Coal & Mfg. Co. (1899), 46 W. Va. 158, 33 S. E. 95; Bailey v. Brown
(1895), 9 Ohio Cir. Ct. 455, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec. 440; Ganong & Chenowith
v. Brown (1907), 88 Miss. 53, 40 So. 556, 117 Am. St. Rep. 731; Halsey
v. Waukesha Springs Sanitarium Co. (1905), 125 Wis. 311, 104 N. W. 94, 110
Am. St. Rep. 838.
6 Butterfield v. Byron (1891), 153 Mass. 517, 27 N. E. 667, 25 Am. St. Rep.
654; Angus v. Scully (1900), 176 Mass. 357, 57 N. E. 674, 49 L. R. A. 562,
79 Am. St. Rep. 318; Lord v. Wheeler (1854), 1 Gray (Mass.) 282; Clark v.
Franklin (1836), 27 Hun. (N. Y.) 557; Hayes v. Gross (1896), 9 App. Div.
12, 40 N. Y. S. 1098; Goldfarb v. Cohen (1917), 92 Conn. 277, 102 A. 649;
Dame v. Wood (1908), 75 N. H. 38, 70 A. 1081; Matthews Construction Co.
v. Brady (1928), 104 N. J. L. 438, 140 A. 433; Carrell v. Bowersock (1917),
100 Kan. 270, 164 P. 143, L. R. A. 1917D, 1006; Keeling v. Schastey (1912),
18 Cal. App. 764, "124 P. 445; Acme Heating and Plumbing Co. v. Hirsch
(1931), 121 Neb. 134, 236 N. W. 137.
7 Cook v. McCabe (1881), 53 Wis. 250, 10 N. W. 507, 40 Am.Rep. 765.
8 Haynes, Spencer, & Co. v. Second Baptist Church (1882), 12 Mo. App.
536, affd. 88 Mo. 285; Robb v. Parton (1929), 178 Minn. 188, 226 N. W. 515;
Cleary v. Sohier (1876), 120 Mass. 210.
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tion the loss according to the contract; they hold that all rights are cut off by-
the unforseen event. Thus, the contractor is not entitled to recover any pay-
ments not expressly due at that time, and the owner is not entitled to recover
back any advance payments made.9 The underlying premise of these cases,
that the loss must fall in accordance with the provisions of the contract, is
logically unsound. The very reason for relieving the parties from responsi-
bility for further performance is that they dealt on a mutual assumption of
the continued existence of the building, or, in other words, that they did not
contemplate and provide for this contingency. The view of most American
courts has been that the fairest apportionment is made by allowing recovery
for part pei'formance; the various standards listed above represent the
various methods of putting this policy into effect. The most satisfactory
disposition, both from the standpoint of logic and reasonableness, seems to
be that of allowing a quasi-contractual recovery for benefits conferred; re-
covery is thus granted for parts of the job put into permanent form and
annexed to the owner's realty such that it was in position -to operate to his
sole benefit had not the accident intervened. No recovery is allowed for
materials not yet incorporated.1 0 The Indiana Appellate -ourt adopted this
latter standard in a case before it in 1903,11 only to be overruled on transfer
to the Supreme Court of the state, which adopted the English rule of no
recovery.12 This rule has been consistently followed in Indiana since that
time.1 3
All of the various rulings heretofore discussed operate only when the
parties have made no express apportionment of loss; the parties are free
to provide for the contingency of accidental destruction in any way they see
fit, if they are foresighted enough to do so. The court in the instant case,
treating the Krause case 1 4 as a binding authority, considered the effect of
the provision that "no . . . destruction of the property shall release the
buyer from his obligation hereunder;" the court construed property, as used
in this provision, to refer only to the tanks fabricated, erected, completed,
tested, and accepted, thus making the provision a nullity. It appears then,
that under the rule followed in Indiana, the risk of loss incident to the
destruction of a building after part performance of a contract to install
machinery falls wholly on the contractor, and that loss can be shifted only
by a clear and exact provision, incapable of ambiguity. There seems to be no
reason for a policy so strongly unfavorable to the contractor.
D. M. C.
9 See cases cited supra, note 4.
10 Carroll v. Bowersock (1917), 100 Kan. 270, 164 P. 143, L. R. A.
1917D, 1006; Matthews Construction Co. v. Brady (1928), 104- N. J. L. 438,
140 A. 433.
11Krause v. Board of Trustees of Crothersville (Ind. App. 1903), 66
N. E. 1010.
12Krause v. Board of Trustees of Crothersville (1904), 162 Ind. 278, 70
N. E. 264, 65 L. R. A. 111, 102 Am. St. Rep. 203, 1 Ann. Cas. 460.
13 Williams v. Butler (1915), 58 Ind. App. 47, 105 N. E. 387; 107 N. E.
300; Bruce v. Indianapolis Gas Co. (1910), 46 Ind. App. 193, 92 N. E. 189.
14 Cited supra, note 12.
